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A Sixth Semester Conversation
Jack L. Sammons*
It is an April afternoon. The conversants' are gathering, a
little later than they had planned, in a law school room endowed
by the wife of a well-known local judge. The room is filled with
plush chairs, a coffee table, built-in bookshelves holding the judge's
odd memorabilia, a fireplace screen with no fireplace behind it, and
two large samurai figurines sitting on antique end tables and
threatening each other from either side of a comfortable sofa. The
partially draped windows look out over the large sloping yard of
the school. Straight down the hill from the yard, past the house
where the one and only cannonball fell on the city during the Civil
War, is the quiet, cherry blossomed downtown. The conversants
are sitting very near where Jefferson Davis stood to deliver his last
speech from the porch of the wood frame house that then occupied
this hilltop site. I am sure it was a solemn address for such was the
nature of the man and the audience, a small group of Confederate
veterans far too old for their age. Down the hill to the right, not
far from a copper-domed auditorium, is City Hall. Inside, there
is a new mayor - a white, bright, brusk, Boston educated, Yankee
pragmatist, law professor - recently hoisted to power by the strong
majority arms of the city's African-American voters. But you
cannot see City Hall from the law school room. You can, if you
get the right chair, see across the muddy Ocmulgee River that runs
half hidden beside the city to the lands that gave birth to the
Muscogee (Creeks) Nation. For those who know sacred mounds,
this three-by-five mile delicate stretch of history, half-public and
half-private, gives to the whole region a perpetual expectancy of
something Indian that, after a first rush of awareness, haunts
forever.
* Griffin B. Bell Professer of Law, Mercer Law School, Mercer University.
1. I do not want to characterize the conversants except to say that they are people
stuck in an endless sixth semester. As you will see, they have had many conversations like
this one before and now share opinions on many subjects, more than they should, perhaps.
Generally, they are talking as friends who are very interested in the practice of law.
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There is one thing to be said for this place. It is something
you cannot say about the large metropolis an hour to its north or
the hundreds of stop light towns to its south. It is a good place to
talk. We join our conversants about midway through their
conversation. To this point they have been summarizing the
content of two books about lawyers, Tony Kronman's The Lost
Lawyer,2 and Mary Ann Glendon's A Nation Under Lawyers.3
So what do you think? Are you happy that these two are
praising professionalism?
Yes, I think so. And I think they're brave to do so when it is
such an unpopular thing for academics to do these days.
Of course it's unpopular with academics. It's popular with the
bar!
No, that's too cynical. I think it's unpopular because most law
professors are far too wedded to liberalism to be willing to accept
the moral authority of a law practice. And that's exactly what
professionalism requires. Law professors are threatened by
professionalism. So they assault it with images of Albert Speer, or
Stevens, the self-effacing butler in Kazuo Ishiguro's Remains of the
Day,4 or Ty Cobb. Still, to get back to your first question, yes, I
am pleased that good thinkers like Kronman and Glendon are
praising professionalism.
I thought you would be.
They troubled me by the way they did it, though.
How? A lot of it reminded me of things we have talked about
before.
I thought they both claimed too much for our practice.
OK, let's start there. You'll have to tell me more about that.
Can I try Kronman first, because his claim is more complex?
Sure.
Kronman seems frightened by the idea that we are a tradition
bound practice very wedded to a certain understanding of practical
wisdom as an excellence of our work.
Wait a minute! That's exactly what he says we are.
Not exactly, but, in any case, he won't let it be.
What do you mean, "he won't let it be?"
2. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993).
3. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994).
4. KAZUO ISHIGURO, THE REMAINS OF THE DAY (1989).
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Tell me first, how you would describe what he is trying to do.
I'm talking about the first part of the book now, the "ideal" part,
not the "realities" part.
I read him as describing an Aristotelian ethic of the practice. I
think he wanted to redescribe for more modern ears, ears accus-
tomed to claims of incommensurability, the ideal of character that
works within our practice like the Athenian gentleman was supposed
to have worked in a Greek polis. Seems to me to be exactly what we
need for all the reasons he gives.
Yes, and what else?
Well, he wants to show why this ideal is appealing, wants to
make it "as attractive as possible. ,5
To whom?
To anybody, I guess? I think what he is doing is offering a
social justification for the practice's ideal. He's showing why it is a
good thing. Why a good lawyer is something that most people
would, or at least should, want to become.
That's how I read him, too, and the last part is what troubles
me. It's what I meant by "not letting it be." His refusal to let this
be is why he claims too much for our practice.
What's wrong? How else would he go about it?
What's wrong with it is that it's ultimately incoherent. I mean
that the argument is in tension with itself.
How?
May I give you a quotation that I brought with me?
Not more Macintyre!
I'm afraid so. Here goes:
There is no way to engage with or to evaluate rationally the
theses advanced in contemporary form by some particular
tradition except in terms which are framed with an eye to the
specific character and history of that tradition on the one hand
and the specific character and history of the particular individu-
al or individuals on the other. Abstract the particular theses to
be debated and evaluated from their context within traditions
of enquiry and then attempt to debate and evaluate them in
terms of their rational justifiability to any rational person, to
individuals conceived of as abstracted from their particularities
of character, history, and circumstances, and you will thereby
make the possibility of rational dialogue which could move
5. KRONMAN, supra note 2, at 165.
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through argumentative evaluation to the rational acceptance or
rejection of a tradition of enquiry effectively impossible.6
This is exactly what Kronman does. He describes a tradition
dependent practice, but then tries to evaluate it in precisely the
abstract way that Maclntyre says makes true evaluation impossible.
In other words, Kronman leaves his practice to evaluate it from
another perspective, one he thinks is much broader and, therefore,
much better. What he really does, of course, is just shift to another
tradition dependent practice. And, according to Maclntyre, this
shuts down the possibility of dialogue between these practices.
But how does this make his argument incoherent?
Let me give you an example: A good Aristotelian would have
to acknowledge that only those raised within the polis could know
who a gentleman was and truly appreciate him. Wouldn't he?
Yes.
Only those raised within the polis, that is, would recognize the
gentlemen correctly, want to become him for the right reasons, and
truly understand why.
Yes. Right time, right way, right reason, all the usual Aristote-
lian caveats.
Well, then, the same should be true of Kronman's lawyer-
statesman if it is the professional ideal of a tradition dependent
practice he presents it to be.
So Kronman is saying, in essence, we lawyers have this
professional ideal that only those trained in the practice can truly
appreciate. But you are suggesting now that much of the book is in
an implicit denial that this is so?
Yes, I think so, and I am puzzled why.
Maybe it's because he's a dean now.
No, come on! Stop being silly. You know he wrote the book
before he had an interest in making the practice look attractive
and, in fact, his conclusions on that account are positively dreary.
I bet his admissions office was not very pleased with it. But why
did he write this book?
He tells us that in the book's Preface.
He does? I skipped it.
Yeah, here it is.7 He remembers himself as a young scholar
called to stand in for an ailing Arthur Leff in a 1981 Yale sympo-
6. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 398 (1988).
7. See KRONMAN, supra note 2, at vii-viii.
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sium on the nature and purposes of legal scholarship. It sounds like
he was quite taken with his position, because he told the audience
that legal scholars, like himself aim for the truth and, because they
do, they are well shaped by their work. But advocates, concerned
only with persuasion, were not. After the speech, a couple of
colleagues asked Kronman the obvious moral question: How could
he in good conscience teach law students to become lawyers if he
had such a low opinion of the practice and of what it would do to
them? His colleagues gave him a running start on the answer. They
argued that a good advocate develops a practical wisdom "as
honorable as a scholar's love for truth." Thank goodness for us -
for we were spared the insufferable book he might have written and
given the excellent one he did - this question bothered Kronman
greatly. He said he's been trying to answer it ever since. So I guess
this is why he wrote the book.
There you have it! There you have the reason why Kronman
won't "let it be." He's trying to answer the wrong question.
How so?
Kronman is trying to decide whether entering the practice is a
good thing for his students to do or not. This means he's got to
come up with an answer that would work for just about everyone.
When you say it that way, it seems like a silly thing to try to do.
I think it is. I tend to believe, as Stanley Hauerwas does, that
we really have no idea what we are doing when we do things like
become lawyers or get married. We find out later.
But why isn't he also writing for those already within the
practice?
Well, he could be when he is spelling out the content of the
professional ideal, but not when he's offering his social justification
for this ideal.
Why not?
Because if the practice is as he describes, then it would be like
telling a baseball player why he should want to be good at what he
does and offering as a reason the social value of sports or some
such nonsense. I can hear it now: "Being a good second baseman
means you'll help maintain political fraternity within the city
because the city will forget its differences as it cheers you on.
You'll provide a shared experience that creates commonalities for
conversation ... blah, blah, blah." This misses the point, don't
you think? It might make sense if you were trying to convince a
city council to build a new stadium to attract a team, but that's
1996]
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about it. But don't get me wrong now! There certainly are virtues
defined by the practice of baseball that provide internal goods that
in turn serve as justifications for a player's desire to be a good
second baseman. But Kronman leaves that kind of analysis for the
practice of law behind to pursue a social justification because he
just "won't let it be."
OK, but what difference does it make?
The difference it makes is that it distorts his spelling out of the
virtues of the practice. Kronman's ideal of the statesman is
confused because of his need to make the practice appealing to
everybody. My guess is that most lawyers will not recognize
themselves in the ideal, and this is not because the practice is too
corrupt now.
I want to hear about how his statesman distorts the professional
ideal but, to get back to why he wrote the book, it occurs to me,
despite his talk of incommensurability, that Kronman is really
looking for an ideal that will work in the same way he thought truth
did for academics.
I think you're right about that. Tell me more.
It looks to me now that what Kronman missed in his conversa-
tion with his colleagues after his speech is that the practical wisdom
they referred to as being "as honorable as a scholar's love for truth"
was not some generic practical wisdom that everyone would cheer,
but a very particular kind of practical wisdom - one defined by the
practice of law. This is how I understand your complaint that he
claims too much. Kronman holds us out as having some kind of
universal practical wisdom.
Yes. Exactly. Kronman put his big toe in the rhetorical
waters of our practice, but he's not ready to jump in yet. I believe
lawyers offer to others, in the counseling that Kronman relishes, a
rhetorician's practical wisdom, as you say. We tell them what we
have learned about the world by trying to prevent and resolve
disputes through rhetoric. At least that is all we can offer
legitimately, by which I mean as lawyers. Of course, it's going to
be a while before Kronman accepts this, and maybe he never will.
Why do you say that?
Look, I think Kronman is brilliant. I loved reading the book.
I loved the care he took writing it.




Well thanks a lot, buddy! But, of course you're right. I do
admire him, and not just because I agree with most of his book. I
was greatly impressed with the straightforward, no nonsense way he
could say things that were still very foggy to me. I also know that
Kronman is a very kind, thoughtful, and interesting man. You can
tell he is, in fact, from the great care he took in setting forth his
thoughts and his fair treatment of the thoughts of others. It is no
surprise to me that he's a dean because his writings exude the
qualities of statesmanship he describes and those qualities are just
what a good dean needs.
But... ? I'm waiting for the other shoe to fall.
But, Kronman is still the kind of guy who will write something
like: "Courage and moderation mean today what they have always
meant, and we can still find even in the most remote antiquity
models of these virtues to admire. The same is true of statesman-
ship as well."8
Whoa! I see what you mean. Funny that he would pick
courage when it has probably changed more over time than any
other virtue. And now Kronman contends statesmanship is a
timeless universal - this from an Aristotelian hostile to Kant?
When I read a line like that one in a discussion of what to do
about incommensurability, as it is in Kronman's book, I know that
the next thing to follow is going to be some strange version of
integrity. Integrity is where conservatives go these days to become
liberals again, philosophically speaking. It's their last foundational
refuge because conservatives think it can work as a "neutral good,"
something they can fall back upon. Everybody wants it, and
because everybody wants it, everybody understands others wanting
it, too. When conservatives use integrity in this way, it works
exactly like either an Aristotelian naturalism or a Kantian self-
consistency, depending upon your perspective. But look at the
person all this rests on - look at the "Kronman man." Being a
"friend to [him]self" is the only kind of integrity he can muster as
he goes through life making existential choices and hoping for
nothing better than "living without regret or self-deception in the
full light of his predicament." 9 "Every monad in his own tepee,"
as our mutual friend Ivan Rutledge puts it.
I think "Kronman man" is in for trouble. Don't you?
8. Id. at 54.
9. Id. at 84-85.
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What do you mean?
Well, I'm just playing with words now, but it is hard for me to
imagine how you can avoid self-deception by trying to be a friend
to yourself. I think perhaps you would be better off asking
someone else if your soul is sufficiently united. But then, of course,
I think that integrity is a culturally defined social skill.' °
Do you think Kronman really believes that "Kronman man" is
who we are? I don't.
I don't either. Not the professor who made part of his
reputation talking about a life well lived in the law or the one who
talks in this book about salvation through work.1" He just doesn't
see any way out of the dilemma of incommensurability other than
to create a "Kronman man" stripped of all traditions. It is quite
clear, however, at least subtextually, that for Kronman this thin
integrity replaces the truth claim he made as an academic, so I bet
he is pleased with it. But I'm still with you because I don't think
he believes it either. 2 Of course, he also offers a universal
practical wisdom as the trump card in his lawyering justification
game, but that is very easy going once "Kronman man" is in place.
And is there really any wonder that the statesmanship required in
this world, this "basic human excellence,"' 13 as Kronman calls it,
is the ability to keep these strangers from destroying their own
communities?
Actually, what bothered me more was Kronman's reverse
Platonic move from the soul to the city, a move he needs to make to
get back to why everybody should want to be a lawyer.
Help me with this because I saw his social equivalent of this
thin integrity, political fraternity, as he calls it, which the statesman
helps create, as just more of the same. Once you give any real
substance to the concept of political fraternity, all the problems of
incommensurability you thought it solved just reappear. Kronman
tries to avoid this by circularity: "By establishing bonds of fellow-
feeling among its members - bonds based upon their willingness
to sympathize with each other's interests and concerns - political
fraternity helps to counteract the destructive force let loose in these
10. See Jack L. Sammons, Rank Strangers to Me: Shaffer and Cochran's Friendship
Model of Moral Counseling in the Law Office, 18 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 1, 40-42 (1995).
11. KRONMAN, supra note 2, at 370.
12. See id. at 85.
13. Id. at 109.
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identity-defining moments."' 4 The only base line substance here
is that some civility or civic friendship or decency is needed for a
community to continue being a community at all. Now, I certainly
agree with this, but it is not very interesting in this context, is it?
Political fraternity might not be very interesting because it is not
fleshed out and, when it is, it encounters the problem you say it does.
Or because it assumes certain communal values to be superior -
and, in Kronman's case, values that seem closely associated with the
politics of the state as opposed to the many other communities we
live in. These are often the very values that are at stake in commu-
nal disputes. In addition, political fraternity might not be very
interesting because it says nothing about who is in and who is out of
the political fraternity - sorry about the pun - and this, too, is
often what is dividing the community. But my point was that
Kronman's analogy of city to soul is problematic in a way that it was
not for Plato, although Plato's was problematic enough. To be
specific, the incommensurable goods that "Kronman man" is
choosing among are different from the incommensurability of
competing ways of life in a community.
How?
Kronman recognizes part of the difference when he says that
personal deliberation is "rarely marked by the kind of self-conscious
exchange that typifies a debate between two separate people. "15
And he has lawyer's rhetoric come to the rescue to make the analogy
work. But this is only part of the difference. The rest is that what
he describes as incommensurable goods in personal decisions really
are not incommensurable at all. He's talking here about the choice
between hearing a lecture and going to a concert, his admittedly
trivial example, or Jean Paul Sartre's citizen son's choice of staying
home to protect his mother or going off to fight in the Resistance. 6
These are certainly incompatible, but they are not incommensurable
in the way that competing ways of life in a community can be.
I don't see the difference.
When people deliberate on personal matters, they may very well
face mutually exclusive choices. Their choices may be between
competing values; they may be tragic - requiring harm to be done
no matter which choice is made as in Sartre's famous example. But
14. Id. at 96.
15. Id. at 100.
16. KRONMAN, supra note 2, at 58-59.
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this competition is just a function of the complexity of personal ends.
The starting point, the assumptions, the premises, the framework, the
history, the narrative, the relationships, the rationality, and so forth,
all remain shared in these personal deliberations, since they are those
of the person deliberating.7 So these incompatible ways of pro-
ceeding do have common measure and are, thus, not incommen-
surable. They are incompatible. This, of course, is exactly what is
not true with competing ways of life in a community.
I see the difference, but what difference does it make? As you
say, Kronman brings rhetoric to the rescue when he shifts to the
incommensurable ways of life in a community.
I thought, as I read this, that Kronman's failure to realize the
difference between incompatibility and incommensurability made him
overestimate the neutrality of political fraternity and underestimate
the inherent moral claims of rhetoric. Perhaps it made him lose
sight of how ruthless, to use his term, the statesman's rhetoric could
be precisely because his statesman is blind to the narrowness of his
own valuing of political fraternity and rhetoric.
Have you noticed how all the problems we are seeing are due
to his attempt to justify the practice beyond its own boundaries; his
refusal, that is, to "let it be"? See now what I mean? I think his
resort to this kind of social justification for the practice of law
corrupts his analysis in the same way he believes economic analysis
corrupts the law school classroom.
I'm beginning to see what you mean. But I want to go back
now to the ideal of the statesman and how he distorts it.
Actually, we don't have to go back because the problems are
closely connected. His lawyer's ideal is the "state's man," because
Kronman needs it to be for his justification to work. He's really
just choosing an ideal here, and doing so almost against our history
as others have argued. t8 But of course, the ideal of a practice can
never be chosen.
17. OK, so you are on to me. This is not really a conversation between two different
people. They are both me. Thus, what we have here is an example of a personal
deliberation. At the end of this conversation one conversant will want to go to the nursing
home to visit with a person he advocates for as a Citizen Advocate. The other will want to
go home to be with his family. These are incompatible. The world outside this room is not
like this. It is incommensurable. Much of what I can see outside the window of the law
school room, a view I described in the introduction, is a constant reminder to me that this
is true.
18. See James M. Altman, Modern Litigators and Lawyer-Statesmen, 103 YALE L.J. 1031
(1994) (reviewing THE LOST LAWYER, supra note 2).
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OK, so Kronman really is only toe deep in our rhetorical pool.
But at least it is for good reason, right? Kronman fears "narrow"
technical lawyering that places partisan goals over the good of the
community, doesn't he? So his social justification of lawyering
permits him to insist to the contrary that the truly good lawyer places
public good over partisanship when the two collide.
No. I am sure that people will read him this way, and he may
deserve it for going on a bit about the statesman, but I don't think
this is what he is saying. When he gets right down to it, Kronman
fears "narrow" technical lawyering because it is no damn good in
ordinary lawyering terms, in terms, that is, of the partisanship that
we lawyers say we are doing right now. You can drop the
statesman's public spiritedness out of his analysis entirely, some-
thing I would suggest doing, and find that he makes a very
persuasive case. What gets him into trouble is that by the time he
does "get down to it" the reader has already had a bellyful of
public spiritedness for the good of the community. So, quite
naturally, when Kronman says that a good lawyer recognizes her
competing allegiances to client and court, and, when he adds that
in choosing between them, she calls upon an "internal anchorage
of ... devotion to the law,"'19 even a careful reader would think:
"Aha! To be a lawyer-statesman one must side with the court to
preserve political fraternity to sustain our fragile communities."
What I think lies hidden beneath this, however, is Kronman's
far better belief that devotion to the law is necessary to achieve the
client's objectives, as the lawyer and the client both come to
understand them through the course of a good representation. This
is what he means when he says that "public-spiritedness is not...
something tacked onto [the lawyer's] professional skills ....
Rather, it is an essential component of that craft and cannot be
separated from it."20  You really have to struggle to see this
because of the term "public-spiritedness." The only reason it is
"public" spiritedness is because Kronman wants to describe a
practice that is appealing to everybody.
Maybe. I'm not at all sure you can read him this way. It was
pretty clear to me that Kronman's talk of the ideal of the statesman
and public spiritedness was there in part to give lawyers a moral
authority of some sort over their clients, a control really. You
19. KRONMAN, supra note 2, at 146.
20. Id. at 145-46.
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incoming students, he is saying, won't be corrupted by your need to
persuade because the practical wisdom you will acquire as a good
lawyer is a universal good providing political fraternity. You'll serve
this universal good primarily, and even at the expense of your
clients' interests, because it is a stronger moral claim than pure
partisanship. Good lawyering consists of becoming the kind of
person who performs well this service to the public through the
representation of clients, and doing this well is a basic human
excellence that anyone in any community should appreciate.
I know. It sounds like that. And maybe this is just wishful
thinking on my part since, as you know, I'm something of a convert
from the position you describe as Kronman's. I would have put
much more emphasis on the public good of simply providing
private representation. In other words, I would have stressed that
it is good for the public to give people an opportunity to have their
say in their own disputes even when this "say" is one "we" don't
like very much. There are very good ethics that derive from the
idea that "having a say" is a good thing. And most of these ethics
match up quite well with Kronman's work.2' But this isn't enough
for me anymore. There's truth to it, but it's still a cop out from the
practice.
What does work for you?
What lawyers do is rhetoric, so they are always partisans in this
sense. To do rhetoric well they have to do just about everything
Kronman says they have to do and more. For example, they've got
to help their clients understand what they really want. Lawyers
must be able to assess the moral claims of the other party and
determine how others hear these claims - not just the court, of
course, because courts provide only one of the conversations they
seek. They've got to confront their clients with these moral claims
in a persuasive manner in order to make the clients better
understand their own goals. While lawyers are doing all of this,
they must also maintain a relationship of trust with their clients so
that speaking for them is speaking for them. When it comes time
for practical wisdom, as we both have said, the only practical
wisdom lawyers can provide to their clients is what they have
learned about preventing and resolving disputes through rhetorical
processes. What the hell do they know about anything else? Of
course, when the content of this specialized practical wisdom is
21. See JACK L. SAMMONS, LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1988).
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carefully considered, as James Boyd White is now doing for all of
us,22 we lawyers find that we have far more that we have to say to
our clients than we thought we did. It turns out that, unlike
Kronman's statesman, we know we have a particular approach to
life to offer our clients. In fact, we impose little bits and pieces of
this upon our clients when they come to us for representation. For
example, we impose upon them our rhetorical view of their dispute.
There are some clients for whom this is not good or not enough,
and to these clients we have nothing to say except: "Go else-
where."
There is turmoil and great tension in all of this. We face
especially rough waters when trying to maintain a client's trust
while insisting that they approach their dispute as we do. Navigat-
ing these waters well is an excellence of our practice, one that only
those who try it can truly appreciate. If you want to learn how to
do it well, you must find a lawyer who does it well. Of course, how
it is done well, and what it means to do it well, will change over
time as we argue, fuss, and fight about this within the practice.
OK, I've heard you say all this before, but where is the authority
over clients when things go astray? When the impetuous client insists
on foul play?
The authority is the same one my plumber has over me when
I tell him to do something that would be really stupid for a
plumber to do. It is the authority lawyers have to say no to those
things that do not sustain the practice of rhetoric that we depend
upon for our own sense of accomplishment. Much of what
Kronman describes as devotion to law, allegiances to court, public
spiritedness, and so forth is really just a good lawyer's natural desire
to preserve her craft. The court, the law, the public, political
fraternity, and even personal integrity,23 as Kronman understands
22. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, ACTS OF HOPE: CREATING AUTHORITY IN LITERATURE,
LAW, AND POLITICS (1994); JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN
CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM (1990); JAMES BOYD WHITE, HEREACLE'S Bow:
ESSAYS ON RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985); JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN
WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE,
CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (1984).
23. What this conversant means here, I am very sure, is not that lawyers should not be
concerned with personal integrity. It is that a lawyer's integrity is different from the
"personal" integrity that Kronman and others describe. Since the lawyer has no "person"
who is not also a lawyer, the lawyer's integrity is necessarily different. This conversant, you
will notice, has previously said that integrity is a culturally defined social skill. The
differences would show up in the interpretation and application of the terms Kronman uses
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it, can be damned - as they are often enough by very good
lawyers - when these get in the way of good rhetoric.
But is that enough? Aren't there things we could do for our
clients that are consistent with good rhetoric, and consistent with the
maintenance of our rhetorical craft, and yet horrible for others?
No, it is not enough, in this sense of being enough. Nothing
is. But let me narrow the field somewhat before I answer further.
First, the ethics of good rhetoric, by which I mean the limits
needed to preserve the rhetorical activity as a good rhetorical
activity and nothing more, are far more encompassing than most
would think. So there is really not that much left to worry about.
Secondly, as I have said, the good rhetorician has to do the same
things with clients and in advocacy that Kronman's statesman must
do: working out the client's complex objectives, confronting the
claims of the other party, considering how a public-minded judge
will view the dispute and how she will best be persuaded, and so
forth. These are, in fact, the techniques of moral counseling that
many legal ethicists offer as the best way of dealing with tempted
clients.24 And these techniques work, or at least work often
enough so that we are really only talking about extreme situations.
Even with all of this fairly considered, however, I think your
problem remains. My response to it is: So what?
You can't respond "so what" to a concern with doing evil. It's
denying the language you use.
No, of course not. You're right. I don't mean that. But I can
say that what is left of this evil is nothing other than a very helpful
reminder to lawyers that the goodness of our lives is dependent
upon the goodness of others. I'm glad my profession constantly
reminds me of this. It is, of course, the same situation everyone
else is in, if they only had the imagination to see it. We lawyers
are given more help in seeing this relationship than are most. Can
I go off on a tangent here?
Could I stop you with a "no"?
I think one of the things that bothers legal ethicists so much
about the practice of law is that it is a constant reminder that we
are, in fact, sinful people. The practice of law deals with people as
they are, and especially as they are in bad times. If there is good
to define integrity.




to be done, the practice says it will be done only in the midst of
this evil. I had a conversation the other day with a theologian who
was complaining about what he called the commodification of
human suffering in torts. He said he couldn't imagine any good
coming out of handling tort claims, especially wrongful death
claims. Why would parents, for example, want to reduce the loss
of their loved ones to money? (And, a question he did not ask, but
should have, is why a defendant would want to contest with
someone who had just lost their child, even in the name of justice.)
I think this is a good example of why ethicists (and theologians,
too) have a general distate for the practice of law. It is messy, ugly
stuff, filled with sin. It is so because people are messy, ugly, and
sinful by nature. The practice of law goes to the place where we
are, embraces us as we are, and does the best it can with who we
are. It expresses a parent's loss of her child as money because it is
important to help a parent proclaim her loss to the community,
even if this loss is only expressed as money. There is nothing noble
about this, but there is something terribly honest.
I think that what the practice of law has long learned from its
rhetorical art, used as it is most often when times are tough and the
world is confusing for our clients - lessons of indeterminacy, of
incommensurability, of how to live in a world in which these are
true, of conversation, of context, of casuistry, of narrative, of
interpretative communities, of sympathetic detachments, of living
with tragedy, of holding on to dissents, and so forth - is exactly
what the world has been learning for itself over the past fifty years
or so. Perhaps this is becoming more evident because times are
now tough, and the world is now confusing for everyone.
Wow, you really are a true believer, aren't you? It's almost
scary.
I guess so. I had a fellow baseball coach, one I greatly
admired, call me a couple of seasons ago because he had a question
about raising his son. He said that his son, the team's natural
leader, had gotten in a fight after a game because an opposing
player, a kid who had been teasing one of his son's teammates
throughout the game, gave his son the finger when they were
supposed to be shaking hands after the game. His son punched the
kid in the mouth. Some parents stepped in, and this incident was
blown out of proportion, but the coach's question wasn't about any
of that. He wanted to know what he should say to his son. "He's
got to stick up for his teammates and for himself, doesn't he?" the
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coach asked. "The world is like that I know, and yet I also know
that I don't want him going around getting in fights with obnoxious
people. What should I say to him?" What I said was: "Coach, if
I had this problem with my son, you'd be the first person I would
call so why are you calling me?" That took him by surprise. I then
asked him: "If this happened in a game what would you tell your
players to do?" "Ignore it!" he answered quickly. "It just
interferes with your concentration; helps the other team. Besides,
ignoring it is a way of telling the other team that they have no
power over you. It's a way of showing them that you are a real
baseball player. Scares the hell out of them when they don't get
any reaction." "So why," I asked, "do you think you should say
anything different to your son now?"
Your point? As my teenage son is fond of saying.
My point is that what we learn from lawyering is far better at
helping us with personal morals than personal morals are at helping
us with lawyering. This is the way the world is right now. In other
words, to take people seriously, to find the good in them, means
taking seriously those practices in which they engage and the
manner in which they engage in them. I think Kronman wants to
say the same thing.
OK, you are truly a true believer, but, to get back on track, can
we really just be good lawyers and call that enough? Aren't there
great risks in that? You know that if Kronman is anything like the
person we have described in this conversation he is going to have a
very hard time accepting this.
Et tu? Next you'll be telling me about Albert Speer, Remains
of the Day,5 and Ty Cobb, right?
Yes, I guess that's where I was headed. Forget it.
No, that's OK. But instead of rehashing stuff we've talked
about before, let's go back to Kronman because I think you are
right that this would be very difficult for him, constitutionally
difficult. Look at what he says about the way practices work when
they are defining themselves.
Where's that? I don't remember anything about that.
Over on page 108. Where he talks about baseball.
Not more baseball.
Yes. You could never talk about baseball too much and this
is what reminded me of the coach story, actually. But look
25. ISHIGURO, supra note 4.
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carefully at what Kronman says here. He's talking about a
"predictable objection" to his making political fraternity a primary
value. His objection is that we must first determine that a
particular community is itself to be valued before we determine
whether the political fraternity maintaining it is itself valuable.
Political fraternity tends toward maintenance of the status quo so,
this objection asks, don't we first have to decide if the status quo
itself is good? Aren't there occasions when we should sacrifice
political fraternity to greater goods such as liberty or justice?
Kronman says first that the normal situation is not revolutionary
and that it would be a mistake to treat it as if it were. The normal
situation is the one you are back in when the revolution is over.
Next, he adds, greater goods such as liberty or justice are always in
dispute, and you don't need to resolve these disputes to know that
political fraternity is good. "To be sure," he says, "there are limits
beyond which one may not responsibly go, conceptions of freedom
and justice that must be rejected out of hand rather than treated
merely as positions in a debate. But these limits are wide ... "26
Kronman may be in trouble there. If our community, for
example, knew which conceptions of the good we should reject out
of hand, much of our need for political fraternity would disappear.
He's put an awful lot in that word "responsibly, " hasn't he?
Yes, but I'm worried about something else. I am worried
about how he thinks communities work because it reflects on how
he believes practices work. He knows he's in trouble, as you do,
so look at what he says next.
Is this the baseball part?
Yes, listen:
In a certain sense, of course, a knowledge of the limits of
an activity is always prior to the art that is required to perform
it well. Thus a knowledge of the rules of baseball, which define
the limits of the game, is prior (both conceptually and chrono-
logically) to the player's or coach's art. But the knowledge in
question is thinner, more abstract, and easier to acquire than
the corresponding art, which is why there are many people who
understand the rules of baseball but few who play it well. The
same is true in politics. It is easier to see what defines its limits,
to know which arguments are at any given moment beyond the
bounds of respectability, than to master the art of statesman-
26. KRONMAN, supra note 2, at 108.
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ship, the art of deliberating wisely about the problems that
politics presents.27
Oh my! He doesn't know baseball very well, does he?
How can you be so cruel? But, you are right. He doesn't
know baseball very well. As anyone who has looked at baseball's
history knows, the most interesting rules of the game - the ones
defining its character, such as: how you should throw the ball as a
pitcher, what kind of pitch you should throw, whether you can steal
bases, whether you should steal signs, and so forth - are not prior
to its art but subsequent to it. These rules are, in fact, the result of
an ongoing debate about what it means to be a good baseball
player and to "perform it well." In fact, we know the true
knowledge of the limits of baseball, by which I mean the true
knowledge of what playing well now means, only through observing
those players we most admire within the craft. Thus, this is the
most difficult thing to acquire; not the easiest.
You are talking about Sandy Koufax's refusal to pitch in the
World Series on Yom Kippur again. You promised me you
wouldn't do that anymore.28
OK, Greg Maddux then. The most important ethical question
in baseball last year was whether Maddux intentionally threw at
Eddie Murray in the fourth game of the 1995 World Series.
Maddux is a pitcher who defines good pitching for baseball, and
good pitching is at the heart of baseball's character, and baseball
is the last shared understanding we have of what it means to live
within an Aristotelian world of virtue. (This understanding is damn
sure not something that ended when Jane Austin put down her
pen, as Alasdare Maclntyre is reputed to have said.)
(Long pause; upward glance.)
Sorry. I got carried away. But do you see my point?
Yes, I think so. Kronman sees communities as he sees practices,
as rather closed activities with shared fixed conceptions of what
either "responsibly, " on the one hand, or performing well, on the
other, means.
27. Id.
28. See Jack L. Sammons, On Being a Good Christian and a Good Lawyer. God, Man,
Law, Lawyering, Sandy Koufax, Orel Hershiser, Looking at the Catcher, and Corked Bats in




Yes, and because he does, political fraternity is a primary
value. What he misses is that it is by challenging political fraternity
that we come to know what it means to be the best of who we are.
Throwing overhand, the curve ball, and stealing bases were all
direct challenges to the political fraternity of baseball and were
understood as such by those who wanted to preserve the status
quo. These were all beyond the limits, rejected out of hand,
irresponsible, destructive of community, and so forth. But they
were also the way by which we came to know, and are coming to
know, what performing well means. (They were little revolutions,
if using Kronman's description helps.) Analogously, what is
actually going on in the conversations in our communities, the
substance of our disagreements, is far more important than the
maintenance of political fraternity. Our conversations and
disagreements are the way we come to know who we are. So
political fraternity is truly of secondary value. This is not to say it
is not important, but it is to say that it is important not to treat
political fraternity as primary. Its importance lies, in the communi-
ties Kronman has in mind, in helping the conversations to continue
at least until they should fail.
Wait a minute! Aren't you now giving a social value for the
rhetorician's role, and isn't it a lot like Kronman's even if it is greatly
devalued? He would say the statesman's political fraternity is the
way we continue the conversation. You are doing exactly what you
criticized Kronman for doing.
Fair enough! But I was really just trying to locate our practice
within the world and not trying to evaluate it by other standards.
But, you're right, for lawyers good rhetoric is its own reward! We
maintain conversations for our own purpose and not for political
fraternity. If we were to do it for political fraternity we would be
engaged in a different enterprise altogether. I guess my only point
on the social side is that we would all be better off if everyone just
did his or her job well, lawyers included. There are hints of this in
Kronman as well, especially near the end of the book.
Anything else on Kronman?
No, except to say that I thought he was dead right about
students not losing their soul, but gaining one, through the case





Law schools shouldn't teach ethics. I think this might be my
test for Kronman to see if he's willing to take another step into our
rhetorical pool. Actually, it might be a better test for Mary Ann
Glendon. Has she convinced herself enough of the virtues of the
common law tradition to be willing to abandon the effort to teach
"ethics" to budding lawyers and insist instead that law schools
teach only the practice's virtues through the common law tradition?
Does she agree that teaching ethics is just as corrupting of our craft
as the "classroom Rimbauds"29 she describes are?
Why would it be a better test for her than for Kronman?
Well, it goes back to what I said initially. Both Kronman and
Glendon claim too much for our practice. If we take our practice
to be rhetoric, as I have suggested, I think you have seen why I
think Kronman claims too much. Glendon, on the other hand, as
much as she values the common law tradition - and I loved her
love for it as she loved Llewellyn's - shies away from this tradition
when she almost wistfully yearns for lawyers who are peacemak-
ers.31 So I wondered if there isn't an underlying social ethic at
work in her book that is not really the ethic of our practice and
one that she would not be willing to dismiss from the curriculum.
You are going to have to help me with this.
I find it extremely difficult to describe the rhetoricians upon
which the common law tradition depends as Lincolnesque peace-
makers, 32 although they do sometimes make peace. They don't
set out with this goal in mind as I think Glendon would have her
good lawyers do. Their goal is much smaller. They set out, both
as traders and as raiders, to speak persuasively for others. Glendon
won't accept this narrower role because she wants a peaceful end
to the conflicts that are the context of the rhetorical life.
29. GLENDON, supra note 3, at 290. This comparison is not fair to Rimbaud who
abandoned poetry as pointless and turned to the real world of gun running while still quite
a young man. Rimbaud would not have stayed within the practice while trashing it.
30. See, in addition to the text discussed here, Mary Ann Glendon, Tradition and
Creativity in Culture and Law, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1992, at 13. This brilliant and brilliantly
written article contains the essence of A Nation Under Lawyers.
31. GLENDON, supra note 3, at 107-08.
32. Glendon uses Lincoln as her model for the lawyer peacemaker. Isn't it ironic that
the man who is our model for legal peacemaking thought, albeit very reluctantly, that a good
way to keep a nation together, and a good way to help people recognize the dignity of all
people, was to kill a few hundred thousand of us. Good rhetoricians, when rhetoric fails,
keep talking anyhow - like Quakers do.
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I can see how your challenge about teaching ethics reaches this
issue. Are you also saying that she claims too much because she
expects us to be peacemakers?
Yes, I am. Look, Glendon, like Kronman, rightfully focuses
on the importance of the common law tradition for guiding lawyers
toward the excellences of their practice. This is at the heart of
both books, and both do it beautifully. However, as I said before,
the conversations that rhetoric requires are far broader than those
conversations encompassed by the common law tradition, the legal
tradition, or the law itself. All good lawyers know this well, as do
Glendon and Kronman. Clients do not come to us just to be
represented in courts; they do not see their problems as just legal,
nor do we. What Glendon neglects is that these other conversa-
tions have their own role to play in shaping the excellence of our
practice. If Glendon were to check herself more, she would see
that rhetoricians are not peacemakers, but that they do prepare for
peace after their own fashion.
How's that?
I'm back to something I said before. Lawyers go to where
people are and do the best they can with what they find. Our
clients are not peaceful people; conflict is inherent in the very
structure of all their relationships. Good rhetoricians know this,
but through the exercise of their craft, they represent clients in such
a way that peace can come when it will. The best lawyers
represent clients in the hope of, and with the patience for,
reconciliation to be sure, but they don't offer it. They only offer
persuasive speech. There are, however, certain things in the nature
of our rhetorical activities, some of which are very well noted by
Kronman, that leave room for peace. In any event, I think this is
about the best anyone can do.
I want to be clear, however, so that you don't jump on me
again, that the rhetorician is not to be evaluated by whether peace
comes any more than the pitcher is to be evaluated by how many
people show up at the ballpark to watch him.
Anything else on Glendon?
No, not really. I just agreed with almost everything she had to
say. The book is a pleasure to read because she obviously enjoyed
writing it. How about you?
Me, too. I agreed with most of it also. I do have just a couple
of observations that kept coming back to me as we were talking.
1996]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
They really have little to do with any of this. You know what it says
in ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 (a).33
The confidentiality rule?
Yes, that's the one. It says that "a lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to the representation ... except for disclosures
that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation
"34
Yeah, so what? That's the one about revealing confidential
information to secretaries and investigators and so forth.
That's how regulators read it, I know. Nevertheless, what is
"impliedly authorized to carry out the representation" depends upon
how one understands what legal representation is about, right? So,
in some ways, what we have been talking about is how to read that
rule.
Gotcha! Neat thought. You and I would enjoy unpacking the
implicit image of representation in the common understanding of
that rule. I bet it's the same nasty one that pervades all legal ethics
courses. Yet another reason why they should be banned, at least
in their current form. What's the other thought?
Well, if lawyers are about rhetoric, as you insist, then it is clear
to me that legal ethicists get themselves into trouble when they start
talking about counseling and advocacy as if these were separate
activities. Maybe they do this because they think that rhetoric is only
about advocacy.
Sounds right to me; let's pick it up there next time.
33. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1995).
34. Id.
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